Military planning and assessment guide for the protection of civilians

This report is a practical guide for military staff officers involved in the planning, execution and assessment of military operations where protection of civilians is or may become an objective. It aims to help bridge the gap between the importance of protecting civilians in today’s military operations and the lacking ability to do so on the ground. This guide provides guidance on which aspects to consider during different phases of a regular planning process, as well as advice on ‘how’ military forces can be used to protect civilians. Protection of civilians is no longer simply about avoiding collateral damage. Military forces are increasingly expected to protect civilians from perpetrators of violence who deliberately target them as part of their strategy. There are many different ways of using military force to protect civilians in both the short and long term – but their utility will always depend on the particular type of threat civilians are facing. The guide uses seven scenarios that describe situations where civilians are faced with fundamentally different types of threats (GENOCIDE, ETHNIC CLEANSING, REGIME CRACKDOWN, POST-CONFLICT REVENGE, COMMUNAL CONFLICT, PREDATORY VIOLENCE, and INSURGENCY). On basis of these scenarios, the guide lists key questions and planning implications for the most common planning steps and tools used by military planners, such as factor-analysis (time, space, force), Centre of Gravity (COG)-analysis, and assessment of various Courses of Action (COAs). A principal recommendation is the need to better understand the perpetrators of violence. Why do they attack civilians, what kind of strategies and tactics do they employ, and which military capabilities do they require to continue? These are key questions that planners need to answer – not only to identify which military responses will protect civilians most effectively, but also how to reconcile protection-considerations with other objectives, such as defeating an insurgency. Operations assessment of the degree to which civilians are being protected also requires a broader understanding of success. There is little point in measuring the number of civilian casualties caused by own forces alone, if the primary threat comes from perpetrators that deliberately target them. The expected outcomes of failing to protect civilians, however, will also vary enormously from one scenario to another.