Hvordan styrke forsvaret av Norge? - Et innspill til ny langtidsplan (2021–2024)

FFI-Report 2019
This publication is only available in Norwegian

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Report number

19/00328

ISBN

978-82-464-3153-6

Format

PDF-document

Size

2.1 MB

Language

Norwegian

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Espen Skjelland Sigurd Glærum Alexander William Beadle Monica Endregard Mona Sagsveen Guttelvik Alf Christian Hennum Sverre Nyhus Kvalvik Petter Kristian Køber Torgeir Mørkved Karl Erik Olsen Cecilie Sendstad Jan Erik Voldhaug Kristian Åtland
In September 2018 FFI was tasked by the Government to evaluate alternative paths for the future development of the Norwegian Armed Forces. Our mandate was to establish a basis for the preparation of a new long term plan. As a key premise, the government intends to increase the defence budget towards 2 percent of GDP. We have therefore assumed a lower budget limit that corresponds to the current long term plan and an upper limit based on 2 percent of GDP. The difference between these two budget assumptions accumulates to NOK 500 billion in the period from 2021 to 2037. Our analysis shows that increased defence budgets can be turned into increased security for any budget within this span. Our analysis also shows that the current long term plan has critical capability gaps and will be more costly to implement than previously calculated. The resulting imbalances will have serious consequences for the overall performance of the armed forces. The Government's first priority should therefore be to strengthen the current long term plan. Doing so will require about NOK 100 billion over the years 2021–2037. Without this increase the current long term plan should be re-evaluated. A further strengthening of defence spending, beyond the required NOK 100 billion, will open up a broad span of possible paths of development for the armed forces. In this report we have analysed four alternatives: 1. To strengthen co-operation with Allies by contributing more to NATO's collective capabilities, carrying a greater share of the burden, especially on NATO's northern flank, and by better facilitating the reception and staging of Allied reinforcements to Norway in event of a crisis. 2. To strengthen national crisis management through increased capabilities in surveillance, intelligence and the exercise of sovereign authority, increased mobility, security operations and civil-military co-operation. 3. To strengthen the ability of denying an opponent in the use of Norwegian territory in a high intensity scenario, through increased capabilities in surveillance, target acquisition and long range precision fires. 4. To strengthen the ability to control Norwegian territory in a high intensity scenario through increased capabilities in defensive operations ‒ in order to stop an opponent's main thrust ‒ and to stop, and, if necessary defeat, the opponent's air and amphibious assault forces. The four lines paths of development are not mutually exclusive. But they do, however, point in different directions, and a new long term plan cannot put equal emphasis on all of them. Determining where that emphasis should be put, will be the most important, and perhaps also the most difficult, decision the Government will have to make in preparation for the new long term plan – a decision that cannot be made solely on the basis of research.

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