Globale trender mot 2040 - implikasjoner for Forsvarets rolle og relevans

FFI-Report 2015
This publication is only available in Norwegian

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Report number

2015/01452

ISBN

9788246426013

Format

PDF-document

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2.6 MB

Language

Norwegian

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Alexander William Beadle Sverre Diesen
Historically, Norway’s security environment has been characterised by the three continuities: Norway is a small state with a great power neighbour to the east, the defence of Norway depends on allied support, and the country’s maritime domain represents a vital national interest. What has fundamentally changed over the last 30–50 years is the globalised context in which Norway now finds itself. This study looks at how future changes in Norway’s security environment may affect the role and relevance of the Norwegian Armed Forces over the next 15–25 years. Initially, the report analyses global trends from a Norwegian defence and security perspective. Next, the report assesses the possible future development of six actors (Russia, NATO, the US, the UN, China, and non-state actors) and in five regions (Arctic, the Nordic countries, Europe, the Middle East and North Africa, and Africa south of the Sahara) of particular relevance to Norway. The report finds that the role of the armed forces as an instrument of Norwegian security policy is likely to expand even further out to 2040, both at home and abroad. At home and in adjacent areas, Norway will have to take greater responsibility itself for deterring outside aggression. This is not a result of fundamental changes in the relationship with Russia, or because the world is likely to become less peaceful. It is mainly caused by growing uncertainty surrounding allied support to Norway in the most likely crisis scenarios. This uncertainty is primarily driven by global trends, changes in our allies’ military capabilities, and amplified by the fact that alternative allied frameworks are unlikely to fully develop until it is clear that NATO has disintegrated first. This development is occurring at the same time as the number of connections between Norway’s political, economic and social interests and events elsewhere in the world are growing. This is likely to increase the relevance of using Norwegian military means abroad, regardless of changes in the threats at home. It may also become more important for Norway to contribute more effectively in multinational operations – either to increase the prospects of allied support or to secure own interests. If Norwegian contributions to multinational operations become motivated by more than expressions of allied solidarity, future military capabilities can no longer be considered solely on the basis of whether they can be used at home and abroad, but also on the basis of whether they can create effects in the operations they may be deployed to. As a result, it may become more difficult to reconcile the requirements of the Norwegian Armed Forces’ various tasks. Whilst certain trends indicate that the demands for military support to societal security and Norwegian military participation in international operations are not likely to abate, a reduction in the size of the armed forces will limit what will be realistically possible to achieve. As a result, it may be necessary to acknowledge that the armed forces will not be able to handle all of its current tasks. It may also become a greater challenge for Norwegian authorities to maintain an understanding among the population that deterring aggression at home remains the armed forces’ most important task, even though explicit threats are unlikely to emerge and failure to handle other tasks may become more evident. Especially the willingness of taxpayers to support the armed forces at the expense of other areas of public spending will be critical.

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