Globale trender mot 2040 - et oppdatert fremtidsbilde

This study looks at how changes in the global security environment over the next 15–25 years may affect the Norwegian Armed Forces and defence planning. It builds on a range of international future studies, but analyses trends and implications from a Norwegian perspective. Even though the world has become more peaceful in recent decades, the number of armed conflicts has risen over the last few years and the foundations of the current international system appear to be changing. This is in particular due to a widely expected erosion of today’s liberal world order, whose stability, principles and values are now not only challenged by China and Russia, but also by the US itself, following the election of president Trump. Yet, the challenges to the liberal order are likely to persist, regardless of the US, as they are mainly driven by high economic growth in several emerging economies and developing countries, especially in Asia, whose power is expected to grow at the expense of that of the West. This transition of power is expected to continue for decades, and has already led to increased rivalry between states in several regions. All in all, the risk of confrontation between states is considered to be growing. For Norway, a gradual erosion of the liberal world order will weaken the country’s first line of defence, in terms of rules and principles that protect small states from great power politics. Furthermore, the tension between Russia and the West has increasingly spread to the Arctic, where the potential for escalation has risen. The greatest uncertainty, however, pertains to Russia’s future after the end of president Putin’s final period. A worst case scenario for Norway is a regionalisation of the world, with a greater acceptance of great powers’ right to use force within their own spheres of influence. In such a case, the demands for Norwegian concessions from major powers will be far greater than what the country may be confronted with today. In a more dangerous world for small powers, Norway will become more dependent on allies. Yet, the prospects of receiving allied support may become more uncertain. Despite increases in defence spending, a greater US presence and new collective defence measures in NATO, many European countries will soon be faced with declining and ageing populations that will make it harder to prioritise defence capabilities. Asia's growth will also continue to pull the US towards the East, while the spillover effects of failed states in Africa stands out as the most certain security challenge for Europe in the long run. Thus, today’s divided threat perceptions are likely to persist, while the recent surge of nationalism in several allied countries poses a new threat to NATO’s cohesion. The alliance is likely to endure, but may become more of an institutional framework for coalitions of the willing, also for collective defence. In sum, Norway’s main challenge will be to reduce the uncertainties surrounding allied support, without simultaneously increasing tensions in the High North. Left unresolved this challenge may grow, as doubts concerning our allies’ willingness and ability to assist Norway become more evident. Nuances of allied support – in terms of what, when and from whom Norway may expect assistance – must therefore be reflected in the planning for different scenarios. At present, the shared interests of the Nordic countries make closer ties in this region the best way to close the gap between situations considered to be too big for Norway, but too small for NATO.