Finding the ‘utility of force to protect’ – towards a theory on protection of civilians

This report discusses the utility of force in military operations where protection of civilians is a key objective. It sets out to find what General Rupert Smith has called „utility of force‟ in today‟s wars amongst the people for the specific purposes of protection, which in this report is termed „utility of force to protect‟. Instead of focusing merely on the operationalization of protection by addressing the so-called „implementation gap‟, on which most current literature focuses, this report will treat protection of civilians as an inherently reciprocal objective. In seeking to protect, the intervening military forces must recognise that the rules of this particular life-and-death game have been established by perpetrators that have decided to attack civilians in the first place. Hence, it is argued that utility of force „to protect‟ can only first be found by understanding how the perpetrators of violence have found utility of force „to attack‟. Three scenarios are outlined, based on the conflicts in Bosnia, Afghanistan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), to show how different types of perpetrators find utility of force to attack in different ways. A theoretical distinction is made between perpetrators that follow „ends-based‟ and „means-based‟ strategies of violence. Ends-based strategies are followed by perpetrators whose ends are most effectively achieved by maximising the amount of violence against civilians, such as in genocides and acts of ethnic cleansing. These perpetrators consider the potential utility of force to be great, and will seek a primarily military solution. By contrast, means-based perpetrators use violence to achieve a different ideological, political or economic goal. These perpetrators view the potential utility of force in achieving their goals as only limited, and will use force to impair the security of civilians rather than kill them. In order to convert any potential utility of force into actual utility of force, the perpetrators will have to fulfil certain premises. The premises highlighted include preparation, coordination, political ambiguity and a presence on the ground. These premises also apply to the intervening military forces. Where there are failures to protect, the case usually is one in which perpetrators have fulfilled the premises, whilst protectors have not. Finally, the report proposes a theoretical framework for adopting a suitable strategic approach in which to find „utility of force to protect‟. Against perpetrators that attack civilians directly through mass atrocities or ethnic cleansing, these victims are most effectively protected indirectly when protectors strike against the perpetrators themselves. Here, military forces must focus on „how not to kill‟ civilians. By contrast, against perpetrators that attack civilians indirectly as a means towards some other end, the population will benefit most from military forces that focus on „how to protect‟ them directly. When this framework is used to assess current operations where protection is an objective, it appears that the wrong strategic approach repressents as much of a principal flaw, as do operational and tactical insufficiencies highlighted elsewhere.