The unrealised case of NATO-CSTO cooperation - explanations and prospects

The Collective Security Treaty Organisation (the CSTO, consisting of Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) has on numerous occasions proposed structured cooperation between the CSTO and NATO. However, NATO has not responded to the CSTO’s invitation in any significant way. It seems that NATO is not interested in engaging with the Central Asian states beyond the bilateral cooperation that already exists, through the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program. NATO has shown no willingness to address common threats and challenges in Central and South Asia together with the CSTO. This report seeks to investigate the reasons for the CSTO’s wish to cooperate with NATO, as well as why NATO is reluctant to engage in such cooperation. In doing so, it firstly describes the motivating factors for engaging in such cooperation on part of the CSTO. The primary factor is the common threats faced by NATO and the CSTO in the Central and South Asian region. But also other factors have induced the CSTO to invite NATO to cooperate. Russia’s dominance of the organisation and this country’s wish to control the relationship other CSTO members develop with NATO might be just as strong a motivation. Liberal theory of international relations explains why states seek together to gain mutual gains from cooperation. A close study of the CSTO’s motivating factors shows, however, that realist rather than liberal consideration dominate the CSTO’s agenda in the case of NATO cooperation. NATO’s response, then, should be amply explained by realist theory of international relations, which claims that power is the defining characteristic of international interaction and that the anarchy of the international system creates an environment where only the strongest survive. A constant threat of obliteration prevents cooperation among actors from emerging. Although NATO is an organisation based on liberal values, a close look at NATO’s reasons not to cooperate with the CSTO finds that realist calculations are dominant also within NATO regarding this issue. Prospects for future cooperation on bloc level between the two organisations seem dim, at least in the mid term future. The current play for power and influence in the Eurasian continent, and the realpolitik this game provokes, prevents cooperation for mutual gains from emerging. Operations in the area where the two organisations’ spheres of interests are overlapping will suffer as a consequence.