The Defence Analysis 2023

FFI’s project «Strategic Defence Analysis» was established January 1, 2021 on the behest of the Ministry of Defence. The project’s mission is, on an annual basis, to advice on the strategic development of the Armed Forces. The analysis evaluates important trends and preconditions, gives an updated picture on its development path, and evaluate how to improve the long-term plan. Russia’s massive attack on Ukraine has created deep uncertainty in our part of the world. It is impossible to grasp all consequences of an ongoing war. This report analyses the consequen-ces that we can identify, together with other important challenges and possibilities. The Norwegian Armed Forces are not able to solve its tasks in the most demanding scenarios. Even though we still remain to complete the analysis of FFI’s new scenario portfolio, we assess that the shortcomings within ground based air defence and anti-submarine warfare persist. Furthermore, additional challenges have been revealed as readiness of supply, medical services and host nation support have been included in the analysis. FFI’s cost analysis shows that there is a fragile balance between the force structure and the economy for the 20 year time period, but not in the period up to 2030. The economic challenges in the 2020’s can enforce delays of materiel acquisitions and other operational measures. At the same time, the defence sector lacks capacity to realize existing plans. The Defence Analysis 2023 recommends the following strategic measures: 1. The Armed Forces should pay more attention towards handling limited attacks and hybrid threats, particularly through surveillance and readiness (in the short/long run). 2a. The Armed Forces should develop a clear, coordinated and realistic concept and level of ambition in order to enhance the ability to conduct high intensive warfare against Russian armed forces in the north. This should be done in collaboration with Sweden and Finland within the NATO framework. 2b. As a minimum, the Armed Forces should realize and develop an ability for area denial in high intensive warfare on Norwegian territory (in the short and long run). Within the denial concept, allied integration is central, but a minimum of own national capability is also required. This should guide all short run priorities and decisions until (2a) is settled. 3. The Norwegian Armed Forces should explore the opportunities that new technology offers to reduce climate emissions, particularly in connection with exercises, training and surveillance (in the short and medium run) and in the replacement of the naval surface combatants (in the medium and long run). The report outlines measures to enhance the operational capabilities and economic sustain-ability. We underscore that any new measures must be financially sustainable.