Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24 and operations

The purpose of this report is fourfold. The first is to highlight the key tenets of FM 3-24. The idea that sets counterinsurgency apart from conventional military operations – that it is more important to secure the host nation population than to destroy the enemy – is counterintuitive to soldiers trained exclusively for conventional war. Its rationale therefore needs careful explanation. Second, to identify what is new compared to previous counterinsurgency doctrines and theory. The FM 3-24 incorporates the most recent lessons learned by US Army and Marine Corps, and is both a source for the newest ideas on counterinsurgency and a source of current US military thought. The report concludes that the doctrine is rooted in classical counterinsurgency theory, above all the works of French officer David Galula. The emphasis on cultural awareness and language skills is new in the context of counterinsurgency doctrine but not in its practice. During colonial wars local knowledge was too readily available and self-evidently important to be included in doctrine. It is novel that the operations often are conducted in ungoverned areas. This changes the role of military forces from being one party in a well-defined conflict with the insurgents to being a partial referee in a conflict between many actors. The third purpose is to enhance understanding of the US as a military actor, particularly as part of coalitions in stability operations. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have fundamentally changed the US approach to international operations. From having the military most firmly entrenched in conventional warfare, the US military forces have in many areas become the leading practitioner of counterinsurgency. Cultural awareness and ability to lead comprehensive civil-military effort are now areas of strength for US military forces. The final purpose is to prepare the ground for a discussion of strategic dilemmas in applying counterinsurgency in Afghanistan and Iraq. The key to successful counterinsurgency is to mobilize all available military, social, economic, cultural and political means for a joint objective. A comprehensive approach challenges civil-military unity of effort, both in developing and implementing an effective strategy. Multinational Experiment (MNE) Multinational Experiment is a multinational concept development and experimentation (CD & E) series which started in 2001 on the initiative of the United States. US Joint Forces Command (US JFCOM) is in lead of the overall planning, execution and analysis, in close collaboration with partner nations, as well as NATO ACT. The current phase, MNE 6, began in 2008 and is a two-year effort focusing on The Irregular Challenge: A Comprehensive Approach to a Complex Problem. Norway is a partner nation to MNE 6. The Norwegian effort is organized through collaboration between the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI), the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) and the Norwegian Defence Command and Staff College (FSTS) on behalf of Innovation, Network Capabilities and Information Infrastructure Command (INI) and the Norwegian Ministry of Defence (FD). This report is part of FFI’s contribution to MNE.